

Wartime Transitions:
Historical Case Analyses Applied to the
US Campaign in Afghanistan (2001 to Present)

A

Monograph

by

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Abstract

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For the past seventeen years the United States has been at war in Afghanistan and has committed significant resources in developing the Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF). Is the US transition of security responsibilities to the ANSF politically driven? This question is examined as the US campaign in Afghanistan is compared to three other wars in which superpowers trained local security forces: the British Malayan Emergency (1948-1960), the US War in Vietnam (1963-1975), and the Soviet War in Afghanistan (1979-1989).

This study tests four hypotheses: (1) more time is required to develop and transition responsibilities to a local security force in a host nation with weak infrastructure; (2) several interrelated transitions occur at the tactical, operational and strategic levels before local security forces are able to operate independently without external nation support; (3) a custom approach is necessary in security forces development based on political requirements established by the external nation; and (4) host nations with a heterogeneous population take longer to transition than nations with a homogenous population. Further, the security dilemma is analyzed to discern if rival groups arm as a host nation builds its security force.

This paper concludes that time spent on an advisory mission is much longer than what is generally recognized. As the United States continues to develop and transition responsibilities to the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and the ANSF, a long-term US commitment of at least 30-years is recommended to achieve a full transition.

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Acronyms

ADP	Army Doctrine Publication
ADRP	Army Doctrine Reference Publication
ANSF	Afghanistan National Security Forces
APH	Afghanistan/Pakistan Hands
CAP	Combined Action Program
CIDG	Civilian Irregular Defense Group
GIRoA	Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
MPABA	Malayan Peoples Anti-British Army
MPAJA	Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
RVNAF	Republic of Viet Nam Armed Forces
USMC	United States Marine Corps
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VC	Viet Cong
WWII	World War Two

Introduction

History offers many examples of external countries who have chosen to intervene in intrastate wars to influence the outcome of the conflict in terms favorable to the external country. These interventions are not always successful, even though external countries invest significant resources into advising and assisting security forces, both in terms of blood and treasure. For example, the United States has suffered more than 2,350 troop fatalities and 17,650 wounded since the start of its campaign in Afghanistan in 2001.¹ Further, the United States has spent over \$700 billion to carry out the war.² The development of security forces in Afghanistan has been a priority of the campaign, as indigenous security forces serve an important function of a state in protecting its sovereignty from external threats and also maintaining order within its own borders.

However, security forces development can take prolonged periods of time, often years and even decades, before an external country decides the local security force is fully capable of operating independent of external support. On occasion, this decision may never be reached. Thus, the commitment of external countries will be tested over time, especially as setbacks occur or progress is not achieved according to transition schedules.

This monograph argues that the transition of security responsibilities to local security forces will be politically driven. The first hypothesis is that the infrastructure of the host state will impact the development and transition to local security forces. Nations with weak or minimal infrastructure will take longer to achieve transition to a local security force than nations with an adequate amount of existing infrastructure that supports economic development, such as transportation networks and public services. The second hypothesis is there are several separate, yet interrelated, transitions that must occur at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels before

¹ iCasualties.org, 2016, *Fatalities and Wounded in Operation Enduring Freedom*, accessed September 10, 2016, <http://icasualties.org/OEF/Index.aspx>.

² National Priorities Project, *Cost of National Security Counters*, accessed September 10, 2016, <https://www.nationalpriorities.org/cost-of/resources/notes-and-sources/>.

local security forces are sufficiently able to operate independently without external support. There will be substantial differences and unique circumstances specific to each transition level. The third hypothesis contends, through the study of past intrastate war interventions both successful and unsuccessful, that an external country must craft a custom approach to develop local security forces based on the requirements and political goals that are established by the external country. In other words, what works in one situation will not necessarily work in another due to many different variables that are unique to any given country in time. Difficulties in establishing local security forces result from groups operating in a nation that have different desires for the future of the nation. Specifically, competition among parties in Afghanistan for control of the government may cause a security dilemma, which protracts the conflict and makes transition ever more difficult. This theory leads to the last hypothesis, that nations with a heterogeneous population will face more difficulties and take longer to transition than nations with a homogenous population.

The amount and type of training for local security forces requires the intervening external nation to make many decisions. If training is indeed required, the amount of time that is appropriate to train local security forces will naturally stem from the political considerations of both the external and host nations. Therefore, in this field of study there is considerable variation as to what level local security forces need to be trained. Progress is slow in building nations, and the nation being 'built' may have incentives to delay the process. Developing nations may not want external nations to leave, as this could mean a reduction in funds and arms for the host nation government, so there are at times incentives for the host nation government to impede progress as well.

In order to understand these variations in transition points, and how they are affected by political decisions, this monograph examines three case studies. Intrastate war intervention of the Malayan Emergency by the British (1948-1960), the Vietnam War by the United States (1963-1975), and the Afghanistan War by the Soviet Union (1979-1989) are all historical examples of

this phenomenon. On average, these wars lasted 12.3 years, with mixed results from the intervention. As is the case in the current US war in Afghanistan, the path towards transition is fraught with political maneuvering and considerations on all sides that will impact military operations during the intervention. The case studies apply to the current US intervention in Afghanistan in the search for similar factors that signal a transition from the US military to Afghanistan National Security Forces (ANSF). Such understanding of potential transitions is critical, as the US intervention is currently in its seventeenth year, and a publicized reason the United States remains involved in Afghanistan is the ongoing development, funding, and training of the ANSF.³

In the following sections, this monograph discusses the definitions of important terms, reviews literature on the subject of wartime transitions, and develops hypotheses about when and under what circumstances such transitions can or should occur to be successful. These hypotheses are then tested via the presentation and analysis of three case studies. Finally, this monograph offers recommendations, based on that analysis, for current US operations in Afghanistan.

Definitions and Background

Definitions ensure common understanding of how intrastate war, security, external nations, transition points, stability, and security dilemmas are presented in this monograph. Intrastate war, often referred to as civil war or revolutionary war, is defined as a war between actors that share common territory under dispute within a state. Further, intrastate war involves a contest for the resources the territory holds, as well as political control over the population within the territorial boundaries of the state.⁴ Linked to the concept of political control is the concept of

³ Stephen Biddle, "Ending the War in Afghanistan: How to Avoid Failure on the Installment Plan," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 92, No. 5 (September/October 2013), 49-58.

⁴ Patrick M. Regan, "Civil War and Territory? Drawing Linkages Between Interstate and Intrastate War," *International Interactions*, Vol. 35, No. 3 (July 2009), 323-328.

security provision. In order to assert political control, as well as control of resources, governments must secure their territory and population.

In this sense, security is both a concept and the responsibility of a government to protect its population from harm. During intrastate war, security entails both protection from internal threats within a state (even sometimes from a repressive government), as well as protection from external threats caused by nations or actors outside of the territorial boundaries of the host nation that may be trying to influence the war outcome. Overall, security is considered a basic human right, as it is incorporated into the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights.⁵ The establishment of security has even been argued as the most important responsibility of a state:

The state's prime function is to provide that political good of security-to prevent cross-border invasions and infiltrations, and any loss of territory; to eliminate domestic threats to or attacks upon the national order and social structure; to prevent crime and any related dangers to domestic human security; and to enable citizens to resolve their differences with the state and with their fellow inhabitants without recourse to arms or other forms of physical coercion.⁶

This monograph contends that one of the utmost providers of security in a state are the local security forces, which encompass both military and police forces. One view concerning security forces generation is that military forces handle the large-scale violence of the state while the police manage the small-scale violence.⁷ Another related view is that military forces serve to maintain their nation's sovereignty from external threats while the police forces serve to maintain security within the nation. Regardless of how the responsibility is assigned, such forces are a key aspect of generating security.

⁵ United Nations, *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (December 10, 1948), accessed April 25, 2017, <http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/>.

⁶ Robert I. Rotberg, "The Failure and Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair," in *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 3.

⁷ Antonio Giustozzi and Mohammad Isaqzadeh, *Policing Afghanistan: The Politics of the Lame Leviathan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 2-3.

Overall, the establishment of security is closely aligned with stability. Local security forces fall under the auspices of the host nation government, and therefore their development may be an important part of a plan for stability. Military stability operations are conducted to “create conditions so that the local populace regards the situation as legitimate, acceptable, and predictable” with an overall goal of minimizing violence.⁸ Hence, US military engagement in intrastate war predominantly includes stability tasks since these operations are directed towards the local population and host nation government.⁹ Stability operations recognize the importance of establishing functional economic, societal and host nation government institutions aligned with local laws, rules, and norms of behavior.¹⁰ Often, the experts and advisors from an external country train the local security forces and then transfer the responsibility of stability operations to them through a series of transition points.

These external countries are typically a separate sovereign state that is militarily intervening into the affairs of a host nation, usually, though not always, by invitation from the host nation. There may be multiple external countries, with different political agendas, that are operating within the sovereign boundaries of the host nation. The purpose for intervention in a host nation by external countries will vary based on the political objectives of the external countries. However, there is usually a desire for external countries to depart from the host nation

⁸ Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-07, *Stability* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 1-1.

⁹ The Army’s core competencies are through combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support to civil authorities tasks, per ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 2-2.

¹⁰ Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-07, *Stability* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2012), 1.

once the security situation is such that the host nation government is able to defend against opponents and the population is secure from abuses by the host nation government.¹¹

Transition points are used as a way to organize, validate, and publicize an external country's withdrawal from an intervention in a sequential fashion. For this monograph, a transition point is defined as a transfer of authority from the external nation for a portion of responsibility of security within the host nation to the local security forces. Transition points should lead to a complete transition of authority at some point, but full transition may never occur. Transitions occur at many levels throughout the host government, such as to the police force, military, or even at autonomous areas within the host nation. Using multiple transition points affords an external nation a gradual handover of responsibility to the local security forces once they achieve a level of stability via their ability to fully manage their security responsibilities and other functions, based upon guidance and under direct purview from their host nation government. However, one of the challenges in accomplishing such transitions is that the increase of security and stability may lead to a security dilemma.

The security dilemma is an international relations theory that has also been applied to study intrastate war.¹² The security dilemma posits that as a state attempts to increase its own security, such as by increasing military forces or armaments, these security attempts will ultimately fail, as other states will respond in kind with their own efforts to increase security, which in turn will decrease the security of the state originating the security build-up.¹³ A security dilemma may appear internally in a state in a similar way. Groups may emerge that hold security

¹¹ Stephen M. Saideman and Marie-Joelle Zahar, "Causing Security, Reducing Fear: Deterring Intra-state Violence and Assuring Government Restraint," in *Intra-State Conflict, Governments and Security: Dilemmas of deterrence and assurance*, ed. Stephen M. Saideman and Marie-Joelle Zahar (New York: Routledge, 2008), 8-9.

¹² Saideman and Zahar, 7-9.

¹³ John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (January 1950), 157-180.

capacities that rival the security apparatus of the state, thereby threatening the legitimacy and standing of the host nation government.¹⁴ Any attempt to increase the capacity of host nation forces will further threaten these other groups, and perhaps encourage them to seek to increase their own capacity, as well. Groups that claim loyalty to the host nation and seek out training may not always remain loyal; this occurrence becomes problematic for an external nation that trains local security forces whom may use their newfound capabilities for purposes other than those which the external nation intended. Put another way, "it is difficult to determine the amount and type of military assistance needed to produce effective defensive forces, but not offensive capabilities."¹⁵ Thus, if a group emerges that dominates the security forces of a central authority, any rival groups may feel threatened when they perceive they must provide for their own security.¹⁶ As the state tries to improve its security forces, the rival groups may also try to improve their own forces, which leads to the intrastate security dilemma. This security dilemma may also provide challenges to an external country wishing to transition out of a host nation.

In sum, the training of internal security forces tends to be a key component of the security and stability of a host nation. However, the study of local security forces development often overlooks the specific challenges of wartime transition decisions. These internal issues are further complicated by the political considerations governing the withdrawal of an external nation's military. The literature review, below, sheds further insight into how such transitions are implemented.

¹⁴ Barry R. Posen, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict," *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Spring 1993), 27-47.

¹⁵ Posen, 44.

¹⁶ Shiping Tang, "The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict: Toward a Dynamic and Integrative Theory of Ethnic Conflict," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 2 (2011), 530.

Literature Review

The timing of transition points by an external nation at various hierarchical levels of both the military and government determine the impact on withdrawal and the point at which local security forces are transitioned. Previous research in this field identifies the security situation, level of infrastructure, and methods for developing security forces as important factors. However, the transition decision itself is often hidden in a myriad of political and military discourse, where it becomes necessary to sort out the specifics of each conflict to uncover how this decision was reached. The path to transition often begins in the study of security dilemmas resident in a host nation.

The security dilemma can be used to gauge the level of interaction between competing groups for the control of a country experiencing an intrastate war. The armament of one group, causing a reciprocal armament of another group or groups, is an easily identifiable example of this phenomenon.¹⁷ If militias or warlords become the first to arm, this may cause an urgent need to develop local security forces. However, the development of the local security forces, as well as their interaction with different groups in a society, will influence competing groups. The level of armament escalation, and level of intrastate conflict, may be especially critical to understanding how security forces development will influence other groups. By better understanding the security dilemma, security conditions are used to build upon security gains in piecemeal fashion. The presence of a security dilemma may limit the ability of local security forces to establish security and even exacerbate tensions during intrastate war.

A full transition assumes that the host nation is fully capable and willing to carry out security responsibilities previously overseen by the forces of an external nation.¹⁸ In this case, the

¹⁷ Posen, 31-35.

¹⁸ Nicholas J. Armstrong and Jacqueline Chura-Beaver, "Harnessing Post-Conflict Transitions: A Conceptual Primer," *Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute* (September 2010), 8.

external nation withdraws politically, perhaps leaving an embassy or other diplomatic team in place. An incremental approach towards full transition is achieved by transition points. Transition points are end states along the way that indicate conditions are measurably different than preceding conditions and now within acceptable standards of security and governance.¹⁹ Two key indicators of transition points are security conditions and infrastructure. If the security conditions are improved in the host country by the local security force, this may indicate that it is time for a transition. How this factor was measured, if at all, is also important. If no standard was met, or measurement took place, then the implications for withdrawal may indicate potential political influence. The ability of the local security force to improve security conditions may correspond with the infrastructure of the host state, as the availability of infrastructure may impact the ability of the local security forces to operate independently of outside support.

This monograph argues that the presence of stronger infrastructure means that local security forces have a greater chance at success. Common problems of infrastructure decay, economic market disruption, and institutions of weak governance in the host nation are all costs from intrastate war.²⁰ The level of training and speed at which the local security forces can be produced will in some part depend on the economic and governance resources of the host nation. The host nation may struggle to generate adequate local security forces on their own, especially without an adequate manpower advantage against an opponent.²¹ As a result, the difficulty of establishing security and resolving conflict in the host nation country becomes almost impossible without external nation assistance, particularly in the case of intrastate war.²² Without adequate

¹⁹ Armstrong and Chura-Beaver, 10.

²⁰ Donald R. Snodgrass, "Restoring Economic Functioning in Failed States," in *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 256-259.

²¹ Anthony James Joes, *Resisting Rebellion: The History and Politics of Counterinsurgency* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2004), 171-172.

²² Barbara F. Walter and Jack Snyder, eds, *Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 3.

state infrastructure, the local security forces face greater challenges because the state cannot meet the aspirations of its people.²³ There is not a lot of literature on the relationship between infrastructure and security force success, but historical examples that lend support to this argument. For instance, Afghanistan is widely considered a weak state, one of the poorest eight countries in the world, as well as one of the two most insecure countries in the world.²⁴ Less infrastructure suggests a poorer and less developed nation, which holds a greater risk of civil war.²⁵ This, in turn, suggests security forces development will take longer. Thus, this monograph adds to the literature regarding the impact of infrastructure on transition decisions, as well as security forces training.

The external nation should train local security forces to adequately assume the duties of host nation security while conducting operations along with the forces of the external nation during the military intervention. The success of independent operations of the local security forces indicates the level of involvement required from external nation partners.²⁶ One of the most difficult decisions an external nation faces is not only the extent of training required for a local security force, but also when they are deemed capable and ready for the transition.²⁷ Similar to the custom approach required by an external nation to achieve its goals, a separate but related approach is required to determine the amount of time and resources devoted to build the local

²³ Christopher Clapham, "The Global-Local Politics of State Decay," in *When States Fail: Causes and Consequences*, ed. Robert I. Rotberg (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 83.

²⁴ Stewart Patrick, "'Failed' States and Global Security: Empirical Questions and Policy Dilemmas," *International Studies Review*, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Winter 2007), 650.

²⁵ S. Mansoob Murshed, "Inequality, indivisibility and insecurity," in *Intra-State Conflict, Governments and Security*, eds. Stephen M. Saideman and Marie-Joelle Zahar (New York: Routledge, 2008), 55.

²⁶ Olga Oliker, *Building Afghanistan's Security Forces in Wartime: The Soviet Experience* (Pittsburgh, PA: RAND Corporation, 2011), 72.

²⁷ Vanda Felbab-Brown, *Aspiration and Ambivalence: Strategies and Realities of Counterinsurgency and State Building in Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2013), 213.

security forces to the point of the transition, as well as instituting a force generation process within the local security force so they can self-sufficiently regenerate their own forces. This function falls within building partner capacity and host-nation ownership.²⁸ Indicators on the desire of the host nation to have the external nation either remain or leave, and the level of support necessary to achieve the transition, drive the transition decision itself. This monograph expands current literature through the exploration of security forces training and the benefits of maintaining a long-term presence during security forces development missions. It is important to understand how local security forces development lends itself to the external nation's political objectives.

With the basic understanding of local security forces development in place and the academic gaps listed in what will be further explored, the three historical cases are examined with a detailed look into the similarities and differences of how the local security forces were trained in each engagement. Particular attention will be paid to the four hypotheses: first, less infrastructure means a longer transition time; second, there are several transitions that must occur at various levels of the host nation government and military; third, a custom approach is required based on political considerations; and finally, host nations with a heterogeneous population require longer transition timelines than a homogenous population.

Case Studies in Wartime Transitions

This monograph examines three case studies, in order of their occurrence. The case studies provide information on a varied range of experiences that superpowers faced in the development of a local security force. This leads to one limitation of this research, as only superpowers are studied.²⁹ Despite similar military approaches by the three superpowers, each

²⁸ ADP 3-07, *Stability*, 4.

²⁹ However, weaker states may not possess the capability to intervene in as great a capacity, and therefore may be less likely to attempt the development of a local security force.

case offers a unique political environment which provides a way to examine how transition points were affected by political issues.

The British Malayan Emergency exhibits a focus on the political nature of this contest more than the other two cases, as at the time the Crown was in the process of decolonization. The US War in Vietnam followed on the heels of French decolonization, so in many respects the US military was viewed as an occupying power by the Vietnamese people during the conflict. The Soviet War in Afghanistan was unique in that the Afghanistan government was never able to unify the groups nominally under its control. The overall political goal remained similar in all three cases: to insert a stable government in a host nation compatible with each superpower's interests, including a local security force subordinate to, and acting in the best interests of, the host nation government.

British Malayan Emergency Case Study

The Malayan Emergency was an intrastate war fought by the British against communist terrorists in what is now present-day peninsular Malaysia.³⁰ British economic interest in Malaya was largely focused on rubber plantations, as the rubber constituted sales that surpassed all other British exported goods.³¹ Therefore, political considerations were at play from the start due in part to this underlying economic factor. The British used a classic non-escalatory formula to defeat the rebels, who were practicing communist revolutionary war tactics that stemmed from those Mao Tse-tung successfully prosecuted in China.³² The political implications of the

³⁰ Andrew Mumford, *The Counter-Insurgency Myth: The British Experience of Irregular Warfare* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 28-29. For economic reasons, the British labeled the intervention an "emergency" rather than a "war," as British planters and miners would not be eligible for such insurance claims from property damages in a war zone. Hence, for twelve years this conflict was designated as an emergency.

³¹ Mumford, 26.

³² Noel Barber, *The War of the Running Dogs: How Malaya Defeated the Communist Guerillas, 1948-60* (London: Cassell, 1971), 327.

Emergency required a British response that ensured commitment to the defeat of the communist insurgency, with the goal of British withdrawal and an acceptable pro-British Malayan post-colonial regime.³³ However, standing in the way of a smooth governmental handover and transition were the communists in Malaya.

The communist terrorist organization, the Malayan Peoples Anti-British Army (MPABA) under Chin Peng, was the insurgency that attempted to undermine British development efforts. The organization had its roots in the Chinese diaspora in Malaysia, and was tied to the Malayan Communist Party (MCP), which formed in 1931.³⁴ MPABA formed from its predecessor, the Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA).³⁵ An underground organization called the Min Yuen functioned to support intelligence and logistics for the communist insurgents, with plans for the Min Yuen to eventually provide the alternate government once the British occupiers were defeated.³⁶ Combatting the communists were the local security forces, which numbered ten infantry battalions and 9,000 Malay police officers at the outset of the Emergency.³⁷ With British assistance, the Malay military forces had the responsibility of destroying the communist terrorists, while the Malay police forces protected the population against intimidation from the insurgents.³⁸ Over a long struggle that lasted more than a decade and pitted each side against the other for

³³ Mumford, 29-30.

³⁴ Donald Mackay, *The Malayan Emergency 1948-60: The Domino That Stood* (United Kingdom: Brassey's, 1997), ix. The Chinese diaspora in Malaysia held ties to communism and the affairs in China.

³⁵ Barber, 34-35. Ironically, the MPAJA fought alongside the British against the Japanese during Japan's occupation of Malaya during World War II (WWII). After WWII and the end of the Japanese threat, Chin Peng planned to mobilize the resident Chinese to oust the British and set up a communist state.

³⁶ Mackay, 35.

³⁷ Robert Jackson, *The Malayan Emergency: The Commonwealth's Wars 1948-1966* (New York: Routledge, 1991), 17.

³⁸ Jackson, 17.

control of the Malayan population, the British-trained Malayan security forces eventually defeated the communists.

Overcoming a complicated process of trial and error, the British success in defeating the communist insurgency has been credited for several reasons. First, the British successfully separated the Malay population from the communist insurgents, thereby preventing the population from being a base of support for the insurgency. This also allowed the local security forces to narrow their focus on the fight against the insurgents.³⁹ The approach was known as the Briggs Plan, after Harold Briggs, who took over as the new Director of Operations for the Malayan Emergency.⁴⁰ This separation of the insurgents from the population was accomplished in part by a major resettlement program that secured a half million people with provisions of governance, schooling, and healthcare, and was effectively established and administered in only three years.⁴¹ The communists were often isolated as they did not have an external nation to rely on for monetary or arms support, nor sanctuary.⁴² In order to address the security dilemma caused by increasingly powerful Malaysian forces, an amnesty program was provided for MCP members for themselves and their families, which even included an option for repatriation to China if they refused to renounce Communism.⁴³

Second, the British won the battle for popular support. Chin Peng did not have an effective strategy to rally popular support for his insurgency, which partly led to his downfall.⁴⁴

³⁹ Jackson, 116.

⁴⁰ Barber, 113-115.

⁴¹ Mackay, 152.

⁴² Anthony Short, *The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960* (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1975), 318. Support or advice from China or the Soviet Union to the Malayan Communists was at best uncertain.

⁴³ Jackson, 59.

⁴⁴ Mackay, 151-152.

The British countered the communist narrative of a British attempt to retain power over Malay by transitioning security to the local security forces and providing the Malay government with incremental steps towards self-governance.⁴⁵ The British training of local security forces played a central role in defeating the communist threat. Since the communists had experience, as they were armed and trained during the Japanese occupation, the British needed to field a local security force that was capable of countering this group.⁴⁶ As the local security forces steadily improved and took on more responsibility, the British were able to craft a counterinsurgency strategy that persuaded the minds before winning the hearts of the Malay population.⁴⁷ Namely, the British decolonization strategy focused on the Chinese population, mostly with the rural squatters, to convince them that an independent Malaya was the preferred government over a communist one.⁴⁸

The infrastructure of Malaya also impacted the British ability to train local security forces. Malaya is separated geographically between the unpopulated jungle areas, which consume the majority of the landscape of the countryside, and the heavily populated urban areas, naturally lending itself to structure and neat divisions for security purposes. The main industries were rubber and tin ore, as Malaya was the world's largest supplier of rubber at the time. The heavily populated areas were also equipped with roads, a telephone network, agricultural areas, and the vast majority of the country's wealth.⁴⁹ With this endowment of natural resources and

⁴⁵ Jackson, 116-117.

⁴⁶ Richard L. Clutterbuck, *The Long Long War: Counterinsurgency in Malaya and Vietnam* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), 178. The police force that was able to restore law and order has been proposed as the decisive element in the Malayan Emergency.

⁴⁷ David Hack, "Using and Abusing the Past: The Malayan Emergency as Counterinsurgency Paradigm," in *The British Approach to Counterinsurgency: From Malaya and Northern Ireland to Iraq and Afghanistan*, ed. Paul Dixon (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 230.

⁴⁸ James R. Arnold, *Jungle of Snakes: A Century of Counterinsurgency Warfare from the Philippines to Iraq* (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2009), 148-149.

⁴⁹ Mackay, 6-7.

infrastructure in Malaya, the British did not have to expend as much effort on economic or governance development. Rather, they focused much of their attention on the training of the local security forces; these forces would ensure a stable government that would remain amenable to British trade after the British withdrawal.

Several transition points occurred throughout the Emergency. While the British Government oversaw the Malayan Emergency, extensive powers were bestowed to the commanders-in-chief running operations and creating the strategy to turn Malaya into a fully self-governing nation.⁵⁰ This meant that tactical and operational level decisions on transition points were left to commanders close to the action. The most prominent political transition point came from a London conference in early 1956, which outlined the introduction of a constitution for the full independence of Malaya, and eventually set Independence Day as 31 August 1957.⁵¹ Despite this political end-date, British forces would still remain in Malaya for another three years, assisting the Malayan security forces in rooting out the remaining Communist hard-liners. Surprisingly, after Independence, less than half the troops in Malaya were actually Malayan.⁵²

The British had developed an overall process for the decolonization of their colonies. They estimated that preparing a colony for independence took at least thirty years, since this is the timeframe to put a generation through school and for the graduates to take up leadership of the country. Despite WWII, the British began preparing Malaya for transition in the 1920s and 1930s. A key aspect of this process is not only the experience gained in filling the administrative and bureaucratic responsibilities of running government, but also the shared responsibility which

⁵⁰ Jackson, 19-24.

⁵¹ Ibid., 55-59.

⁵² Clutterbuck, 146-147. The Malaysians formed the Federation Division of three brigade headquarters and eight battalions. The majority of troops were from the Commonwealth Division, made up of 4 brigade headquarters and 13 battalions (five British, six Gurkha, one Australian, and one New Zealand). The Malayan and Commonwealth troops were under separate command, with operational direction coming from the Malayan Government.

provides a sense of ownership where all wrongs cannot be placed on the colonial administration.⁵³ This long-term process is beneficial because it affords time for a gradual transition and allows the population to adjust to a new government, as opposed to a sudden shock to the system which could occur if the transition was rushed into in a matter of years without allowing time for the governing institutions to mature.

During the Emergency, the initial British focus was on the defeat of the communist enemy more so than a transition to the local security forces. Over time, the transition occurred as the communist enemy was defeated and the Malay security forces improved, especially in terms of intelligence functions, as the Malays assumed positions to take over national security responsibilities.⁵⁴ Even after Independence, many British were requested to stay in Malaya to become permanent employees (as opposed to advisers) of the new Malayan Government, filling in posts subordinate to Malayan Ministers, with no ties to London.⁵⁵ The British worked with both the Chinese and Malays in the military and police functions of security, with neither Malays nor Chinese turning against one another, but instead uniting to form the Malaysian government. Indeed, some leaders in the security forces eventually became leaders in the government.⁵⁶ When the British stepped back and the Emergency officially ended in 1960, the Malaysians proved ready and capable of running and securing their newly independent nation from Communism.

Following WWII, Malaya's population of 5.3 million remained ethnically mixed, consisting of 49 percent Malay, 38 percent Chinese, and 11 percent Indian.⁵⁷ Despite this population mix, which extended into religious differences as well, the groups were surprisingly

⁵³ Clutterbuck, 139-140.

⁵⁴ Hack, 220-222.

⁵⁵ Clutterbuck, 145-146.

⁵⁶ Short, 504-505.

⁵⁷ Arnold, 134.

tolerant and receptive of each other's culture and beliefs.⁵⁸ This resulted in the heterogeneity of the population having little impact on allegiances during the British Malayan Emergency. Over the long run, the tolerance of the population towards one another afforded a new national identity of Malaya to be formed in the years following the British Malayan Emergency.

The transition points of the British Malayan Emergency were mostly based off of the political decisions linked to British decolonization of Malaya, while the transition to Malayan security forces coincided with the political transition of Malayan independence. The number of troops from external nations did not completely withdraw when Malaya became independent; they also helped in rebuilding Malaya after the conflict. The infrastructure of Malaya was protected from MPABA attack and the population was secured and effectively isolated from any political interference by the British and the local security forces. The British were able to successfully complete a full transition with their long-term timeline. Unlike the communist defeat in the British Malayan Emergency, the United States faced its own communist enemy in Vietnam that demonstrated to be more elusive, even when the Americans attempted to apply some of the same processes the British used in the Malayan Emergency.

US War in Vietnam Case Study

Following WWII, the United States intervened in South Vietnam under the auspices of the 'Domino Theory' train of thought.⁵⁹ The domino theory argued that as Southeast Asian countries converted to communism, disintegration would unravel millions of people and natural resources in Southeast Asia, leading to more states becoming vulnerable for communist

⁵⁸ Mackay, 7.

⁵⁹ Robert E. Vadas, *Cultures in Conflict: The Viet Nam War* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002), 5-7. Ho Chi Minh requested US President Truman pressure the British to cease recolonization efforts following WWII. This request and others were ignored by Truman, triggering feelings of betrayal in the Viet Minh. Ironically, Ho Chi Minh was a "free agent" and did not establish ties to communism until after Truman disregarded him.

dictatorships and takeover. Ultimately all trading partners in the area, such as Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and the Philippines, would suffer under this phenomenon.⁶⁰

In order to combat such an outcome, the United States decided to help the French in their fight against communist forces in Vietnam. The French reoccupied Vietnam after ousting Viet Minh forces from Saigon three weeks after Ho Chi Minh declared Vietnam's independence, which effectively started the First Indochina War.⁶¹ Aside from substantial financial support to fund the French war effort, the United States entered the conflict with ten US Army officers arriving in August 1950 and establishing the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam.⁶² As the US presence grew, different methods were tried in security forces development, such as the strategic hamlet program. The progressive initiative, similar to the British approach used in Malaya, aligned US Special Forces troops with village-centered local tribes in the central highlands of South Vietnam, labeled 'Montagnards,' to create Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) to provide village security, small-scale offensive strikes and border security.⁶³ Similarly, the US Marine Corps (USMC) found limited success in implementing a Combined Action Program (CAP) that began in 1965 in the vicinity of the Phu Bai airfield when the local South Vietnamese militias, the Popular Forces, were integrated with USMC rifle squads.⁶⁴ The military advisor operations increased as the United States became heavily engaged fighting in Vietnam, leaning more towards conventional combat operations. Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh also

⁶⁰ George Katsiaficas, ed. *Vietnam Documents: American and Vietnamese Views of the War* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1992), 33-34.

⁶¹ Vadas, 5-6. Following WWII, the major power victors (US, USSR, England and France) held the Potsdam Conference in July 1945 to establish a new world order.

⁶² Ibid., 7. By 1951, the outfit grew to 128 military advisors, working alongside the French.

⁶³ Arnold, 190-193.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 199.

evolved.⁶⁵ The North Vietnamese and their unconventional partners, the Viet Cong (VC), became accustomed to evading US military forces as both sides struggled to win over the rural population in South Vietnam.

As the war grew unpopular, the United States implemented a process known as Vietnamization to transfer authority to the South Vietnamese as the Americans withdrew. Vietnamization was supposed to ensure that the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) were sufficiently trained, equipped, and held the capabilities to defeat the North Vietnamese.⁶⁶ Through Vietnamization, the responsibilities for security would be transitioned over to the South Vietnamese government to enable the United States to withdraw and shift its efforts to provide remote support to its ally. In implementing Vietnamization, the Nixon administration decided and planned on an American extrication by the end of 1972, with aid and training to the South Vietnamese army acting as the replacement package since the communists had not stopped fighting.⁶⁷ However, the remaining US personnel in Vietnam could not build the RVNAF into a sufficient security force as the US forces drawdown continued unabated and the meager Defense Attaché Office of fifty officers was limited to monitoring activities (per stipulations in the cease-fire agreement).⁶⁸ In 1975, the RVNAF did not possess the ability to defeat the North Vietnamese military offensive, which finally united Vietnam under the banner of the north. Vietnamization had failed to create the necessary security forces to defend the South Vietnamese government.

Several factors have been attributed to the US failure to successfully conclude a war that was intended to result in a stable and independent South Vietnam. One popularly held belief is

⁶⁵ Rose, 164. In 1959, North Vietnam decided to resume its military struggle to unify Vietnam under Communist rule.

⁶⁶ James H. Willbanks, *Abandoning Vietnam: How America Left and South Vietnam Lost Its War* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2004), 2.

⁶⁷ Gideon Rose, *How Wars End: Why We Always Fight the Last Battle* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), 170-171.

⁶⁸ Willbanks, 186-187.

that the United States relied too heavily on compiling data and metrics for success at the expense of sufficient analysis to establish trends towards a stable South Vietnamese state. Often, broad generalizations were made and select positive metrics were conflated to give a false sense of progress in the war.⁶⁹ For instance, simply analyzing the total numbers of troops and weapons in the RVNAF does not necessarily provide a useful metric in itself, unless other features such as training progress and evaluation measures are tied into the larger goals of Vietnamization.⁷⁰ Aside from dubious progress measures, difficulties were also found in political attempts to bargain an end to the war.

The flawed Paris Peace Accords agreed to allow 100,000 North Vietnamese troops to remain in the South after the war's cease-fire. This measure added difficulty to an incomplete Vietnamization policy that began too late and did not include counterinsurgency training. The RVNAF relied excessively on the US military for firepower support and were unable to address internal corruption within the RVNAF hierarchy, which led to the untimely collapse of the RVNAF.⁷¹ In laying out his Vietnamization strategy, President Nixon mentioned three factors necessary for the US withdrawal, especially speaking out against a strict timetable. The three factors were the progress of the Paris talks, the level of enemy activity, and the progress of the training program of the South Vietnamese forces.⁷² As it played out, the Paris agreement served its purpose as the diplomatic proceeding or transition to politically settle the war. Despite this agreement used as a political victory by the Nixon administration, the prior years of fighting without consistent strategy had taken its toll on both the United States and RVNAF.⁷³

⁶⁹ Gregory A. Daddis, *No Sure Victory: Measuring U.S. Army Effectiveness and Progress in the Vietnam War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 223-228.

⁷⁰ Daddis, 168-170.

⁷¹ Willbanks, 280-287.

⁷² Katsiaficas, 149-150.

⁷³ Daddis, 57-58. One notable failure was the strategic hamlet program, with hamlets being built in haphazard fashion.

The custom approach used by the United States was unsuccessful. The strategic hamlet program, modeled after the British resettlement programme in Malaya, alienated the rural Vietnamese population with many of the hamlets being overrun. The program also discredited the government and highlighted its inability to provide security.⁷⁴ The Vietnamese hold an ancient traditional attachment to their lands, based upon a belief that the souls of their ancestors roam the sacred soils of the village.⁷⁵ Removing villagers from their lands did not take this belief into account while and the VC began to increase attacks on hamlet locations. Without adequate security and with infrequent visits by South Vietnamese officials, the hamlet villagers blamed Saigon for the forcible relocation and the increase in violence.⁷⁶ Aside from diplomatic and governmental challenges that regularly accompany a military conflict, the flawed military approach did not fully embrace the necessary concepts to train local security forces with the exception of a few stove-piped approaches that were met with limited success. Although all of these attempts had the best of intentions, overall they produced mixed results and were not sufficient to adequately train sufficient numbers of the RVNAF to defend their homeland. Part of the issue stemmed from the previous US-funded French intervention in Vietnam following World War II that left the country in disrepair.

South Vietnam's infrastructure inevitably suffered from the prolonged French Indochina war. Of particular note, ninety percent of the population of 16 million South Vietnamese lived in 2,500 countryside villages, which made up the heart of the Vietnamese social and economic sectors.⁷⁷ Despite the fact the American war effort brought in funds for facilities and schools that provided jobs for many of the unemployed, the sudden US withdrawal left a vacuum and an

⁷⁴ Arnold, 189-190.

⁷⁵ Vadas, 71.

⁷⁶ Daddis, 58.

⁷⁷ Arnold, 183.

economic contraction followed that led to significant social instability in South Vietnam's government.⁷⁸ For the most part, the economic problems that existed during the French occupation continued on during American military intervention. Ultimately, domestic political dynamics in the United States would trump the build-up and transition to the South Vietnamese security forces, as the United States hurriedly began to leave Vietnam, at the expense of most other factors.

The effects following French occupation left a country that was in search of post-colonial sovereignty and national identity, both in the northern and southern parts of the divided nation. Overall, the Vietnamese held a Confucian-based cultural belief known as *trung*, which argued for loyalty to the emperor only if the emperor was a Vietnamese patriot first and not beholden to foreigners. As the South Vietnamese government was dependent on French and American support, the legitimacy for those in power backed by the foreigners did not encourage popular support.⁷⁹ The homogenous population of Vietnam was mostly segregated from foreign interference.

The United States eventually withdrew from South Vietnam for political reasons prior to the establishment of adequate South Vietnamese security forces. Trained security forces were incapable of maintaining South Vietnam's sovereignty. In many respects, the progress of the RVNAF did not matter, as the US focus was set on withdrawal regardless of Vietnamese security force readiness. The political transition trumped the military transition. On their own, the RVNAF were not strong enough to defeat the North Vietnamese forces. United States and South Vietnamese government meddling frustrated most of the rural villagers who were struggling from decades of war that had taken its toll on the countryside. Progress was limited in all areas, suggesting the transition was rushed due to the US domestic political necessity of withdrawal. In

⁷⁸ Vadas, 75.

⁷⁹ Ibid., 61.

the following years, the Soviets experienced troubles to those that the Americans faced in Vietnam when the Soviet Union attacked into Afghanistan in 1979.

Soviet War in Afghanistan Case Study

Afghanistan is a country that is more familiar with times of war more than times of peace. During a time of internal political turmoil, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979, following the murder of Afghan President, Nur Mohamed Taraki, by the Prime Minister, Hafizullah Amin.⁸⁰ President Taraki, head of Afghanistan's communist political party, had only been in power since the previous year, although in that short amount of time he had consolidated power, and brought the country under Moscow's sway.⁸¹ Afghanistan and the Soviet Union held close ties dating back to 1917, when Afghanistan was the first country to recognize the Bolshevik government after the Russian Revolution.⁸² In addition, Russia shared a border with Afghanistan and as part of its local sphere of influence, the Soviet Union felt compelled to intervene in Afghanistan to uphold communism in the country following Taraki's assassination and subsequent political unrest. Initial Soviet goals were to stabilize the government, secure the main towns and roads, train the local Afghan security forces, and then withdraw all Soviet troops. The Soviets forecast that accomplishing all of these goals would take six months.⁸³ The Soviet strategy of intervention was largely based on pacification efforts to initially quell the armed opposition in the countryside, aimed at the stabilization of the military-political situation in the major areas of Afghanistan.⁸⁴ However, pacifying Afghanistan was easier said than done.

⁸⁰ Rodric Braithwaite, *Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan 1979-89* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 7.

⁸¹ Gregory Feifer, *The Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan* (New York: Harper Collins, 2009), 23-24.

⁸² Feifer, 21.

⁸³ Braithwaite, 8.

⁸⁴ Antonio Giustozzi, *War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan 1978-1992* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2000), 119.

The Soviets were up against the Mujahideen, an armed Islamic resistance group and insurrection vying for control of Afghanistan.⁸⁵ The Mujahideen were skilled guerilla fighters who also understood the value and necessity of having the support of the local population. The Mujahideen were often competing with Soviet forces in providing welfare and social programs to attract popular support, in areas such as health, culture, finance and education.⁸⁶ In order to defeat the Mujahideen, create a government that was amenable to the Soviet Union, and remove themselves militarily from Afghanistan, the Soviets conducted their war in Afghanistan by slowly transferring control over to the Afghan forces.⁸⁷ During the war the Soviets put considerable effort and emphasis into creating Afghanistan security forces in the Soviet image.

Soviet advisors included a mixture of experienced and talented civilian and military personnel who operated with and advised in various facets of Afghanistan government and military organizations for decades. The first Soviet 23 military advisors arrived in 1956, slowly increasing their presence over the years.⁸⁸ In 1980, 2,800 Soviet men and women were civilian advisors for construction and farming projects, in addition to approximately 1,700 advisors from the Soviet military largely devoted to the Afghan Army.⁸⁹ Despite significant manpower resources, the Soviets faced challenges specific to the nature of Afghanistan.

Soviet challenges in creating security forces included the independent nature of the border and tribal militias with little to no loyalty to the central government, frequent desertions of Afghan security forces personnel from units that were already suffering from half-manning of end

⁸⁵ Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Gress, eds, *The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost* (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2002), 9.

⁸⁶ Feifer, 137.

⁸⁷ Grau and Gress, 12-14.

⁸⁸ Antonio Giustozzi, *The Army of Afghanistan: A Political History of a Fragile Institution* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 104.

⁸⁹ Robert Johnson, *The Afghan Way of War: How and Why They Fight* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 209-210.

strength, and poor maintenance of Soviet equipment which was prone to malfunction difficult to fix since there were few capable and trained Afghan maintenance personnel.⁹⁰ A conscript system was in place to fill the ranks of the Afghanistan military, although the military commissariats were only able to draft sixty-five percent of the required personnel.⁹¹ The Soviets could not develop their Afghanistan security forces into a competent and sufficient force to maintain the Afghanistan government. All of these problems factored into the final decision for the Soviet withdrawal and the Soviet-trained Afghanistan security forces taking the lead for security in the country. After the withdrawal of Soviet forces, advisors and external support for the Afghan government, the Afghan regime collapsed. With nothing in its place, the civil war the Soviets tried to quell quickly resumed.⁹²

Afghanistan is a very poor country with a weak economy, which contributes to difficulties in governance and control. Eighty-five percent of Afghanistan is covered by mountains, and the country has a poorly developed road network. The 'ring' road connecting its main cities is less than twenty-five percent paved. The vast majority of the economy in Afghanistan is based on agriculture, which minimally provides the food and resources necessary to support the local economy.⁹³ Further, Afghanistan's economy was heavily reliant on the Soviets. At the time of intervention, the Soviet Union was the largest trading partner for Afghanistan, while Afghanistan became a clearinghouse of sorts for Soviet goods.⁹⁴

⁹⁰ Olikier, xviii-xix.

⁹¹ Grau and Gress, 50.

⁹² Austin Long, Stephanie Pezard, Bryce Loidolt, and Todd C. Helmus, *Locals Rule: Historical Lessons for Creating Local Defense Forces for Afghanistan and Beyond* (Pittsburgh, PA: RAND Corporation, 2012), 147.

⁹³ Grau and Gress, 3-5.

⁹⁴ Magnus Marsden, "From Kabul to Kiev: Afghan trading networks across the former Soviet Union," *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 49, No. 4 (March 2015), 1032.

Leading up to transition the Soviets were particularly concerned with the size and abilities of the Afghanistan security forces. The desire to build-up the Afghan armed forces was the single most important reason in the delay of the Soviet withdrawal until early 1989, designed to stabilize Afghanistan and strengthen the Kabul government.⁹⁵ Many Afghans were trained in the Soviet Union and then were placed into more senior Afghan Army positions to facilitate the tasks of the Soviet advisors, especially in the latter half of the Soviet intervention.⁹⁶ The Soviet advisors were also responsible to Moscow for metrics of the security forces, such as desertion rates, which led to the advisers intervening in operations at the local level, as opposed to advising Afghan leaders.⁹⁷ These problems facing the advisors remained in the background, however, while diplomatic negotiations between the Soviet and Afghan governments became the priority.

Ultimately, the challenges of security forces development took a back seat to political negotiations to end the conflict. The 1988 Geneva Accords provided the political framework to end the war and transition to the Afghans.⁹⁸ The year after Soviet withdrawal, stability in Afghanistan deteriorated as a coup was attempted, and the Afghan government's confidence in the security forces eroded as the government decided to rely on large militias instead. Effectively, the Afghan government could not trust its own security forces. However, the militias not only failed to establish security, but made matters worse by fragmenting society.⁹⁹ As it turned out, the varied population in Afghanistan added an additional set of challenges to the mission.

⁹⁵ Artemy M. Kalinovsky, *A Long Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011), 2.

⁹⁶ Giustozzi, *The Army of Afghanistan*, 108.

⁹⁷ Olikar, 47.

⁹⁸ Johnson, 241.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, 247. The militia leaders became warlords after the militias were disbanded due to the removal of Soviet funding.

The population in Afghanistan is widely diverse, with many different ethnic groups, tribes, and religions calling the country home. Islam is the only element common to the majority of the population. Even so, societal divisions based on politics and ideologies trumps any religious cohesiveness.¹⁰⁰ Material interests are the driving factor for any segment of the population.¹⁰¹ Allegiances are based on these local connections, as historically, the state has never been able to govern areas outside of the population centers.¹⁰² Afghans have even called it the “six-mile rule,” where government projects extend only this far from the population centers.¹⁰³ Thus, the heterogeneity in the Afghan population, reliant on local politics and business, challenged the government’s efforts to create security forces that were capable and loyal to the Afghan government. The challenge for local security forces was to operate in this web of local ties, while trying to strengthen the national government, without giving preferential treatment to any particular group.

With the Soviet and Afghanistan governments intertwined, Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev, who took power in 1985, initially believed like his predecessors that stability was necessary in Afghanistan before withdrawing Soviet troops. However, Gorbachev faced other competing demands of Soviet commitments around the world, and the desire to maintain Soviet prestige—which the conflict in Afghanistan threatened—also factored into Soviet decision-making on Afghanistan in the 1988 Geneva Accords.¹⁰⁴ Thus, the eventual Soviet decision to withdraw was rooted in evolving political considerations.

¹⁰⁰ Johnson, 301.

¹⁰¹ Giustozzi, *War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan*, 129.

¹⁰² Dipali Mukhopadhyay, *Warlords, Strongman Governors, and the State in Afghanistan* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 2. Susanne Schmeidl, “Civil Society and State-Building in Afghanistan,” in *Building State & Security in Afghanistan*, eds. Wolfgang Danspeckgruber with Robert P. Finn (Princeton, NJ: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007), 122.

¹⁰³ Anne Evans, Nick Manning, Yasin Osmani, Anne Tully and Andrew Wilder, *A Guide to Government in Afghanistan* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2004), 142.

¹⁰⁴ Kalinovsky, 74-75.

Despite the best efforts of Soviet leadership and advisors over 33 years, the withdrawal occurred prior to the establishment of adequate Afghanistan security forces. The Afghanistan government, still supported by the Soviet Union after withdrawal, eventually collapsed, not long after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. With such weak infrastructure and rampant poverty, the Afghan population was more dependent on local authorities and warlords to meet their personal needs. This added layer of complexity made security forces development difficult, since defeating an insurgency and gaining local legitimacy were being conducted in parallel. Similar to other powerful nations expecting a quick victory in resolving an intrastate war, the Soviets underestimated their opponent, misunderstood their problem set, and overestimated what their military could accomplish in building local security forces.

Analysis and Findings

As seen in all three case studies, significant challenges facing external nations engaged in security forces development stemmed from the complexity of counterinsurgency-style conflict. Stability and nation-building measures were especially important. The collaboration of all sources of national power, such as diplomatic, information, and economic, became necessary and relevant in improving all aspects of another state. Government-wide failure was common if the host nation government was weak in any area of national power itself. Furthermore, building various government institutions and local security forces became a complex affair, requiring unity of action from all parties influencing this activity. Political structures appeared to fall apart when the civil war was left to an inadequate local security force without external military support.

Using a collaborative political-military approach, the British were able to achieve success in the Malayan Emergency, but that was largely dependent on the particular war and conditions present at the time, where coercion was heavily used instead of a 'winning hearts and minds'

approach.¹⁰⁵ The British did not rush to transition in Malaya and a security dilemma was prevented. The other two case studies also used political-military approaches, but the insurgent could not be defeated by the local security force and a security dilemma ensued. In the Vietnam and Afghanistan case studies, the local security forces were not yet mature or strong enough to contain their adversaries and create security within their nations by the time that the external interveners withdrew. At all times, the intrinsic and varying influence of political realities and context on military operations remained an overarching theme within all three case studies, lending support for the main argument that the transition of security responsibilities to local security forces is politically driven. While the politically driven nature of transitions appears to be a constant, further analysis of the hypotheses reveals mixed results.

This monographs' first hypothesis states that poor or minimal infrastructure within a state at the outset of conflict makes the development of local security forces more difficult. This hypothesis is relevant to the length of time, in terms of years and even decades, required to defeat an insurgency, with constant expense and commitment from an external nation. Therefore, how can local security forces be established quickly and with as little resources as possible in a country with endemically poor infrastructure? As states become tied up in infrastructure building projects, the intervention naturally expands in terms of time and resources required. This becomes a political decision in each case study as the political importance of the conflict was consistently measured against the host nation's resources and willingness to be committed.

The anticipated time period judged adequate to establish security forces capable of handling responsibility for the local security situation was another consideration in each case. There is little evidence found in the case studies that local security forces can be developed in a condensed timeframe, such as in a few years. Due in part from vast colonial experience, the

¹⁰⁵ Paul Dixon, "The British Approach to Counterinsurgency: 'Hearts and Minds' from Malaya to Afghanistan?" in *The British Approach to Counterinsurgency: From Malaya and Northern Ireland to Iraq and Afghanistan*, ed. Paul Dixon (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 3.

British appeared to be the only external nation that viewed the development of local security forces as a long-term venture. The British further understood that society-wide development, aside from just development in one or two sectors, was critical to a successful counterinsurgency. In essence, a whole-of-government approach appears to be necessary for successful external intervention. Even though the average length of the wars in these three case studies was roughly twelve years, the actual presence of advisors in country preceded each conflict by several years. This finding suggests that the development of security forces is an incredibly lengthy process that requires a long-term commitment of decades, not years. In addition, even the long-term approach does not necessarily equate with positive results either, as seen in the study of Soviet advisors in Afghanistan for more than three decades.

The second hypothesis posits there are several separate but related transitions at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels required before local security forces can operate without external support. The cases exhibit how the development of local security forces cross all levels of military operations and impact diplomatic relationships, especially in planning. For instance, the top military and civilian leadership in each case put substantial planning effort into generating security forces and took into account the status of security forces when deciding to withdraw their military and civilian advisors. In particular, both Nixon and Gorbachev were cognizant of the political reality that the local security force would be necessary to uphold the national government after withdrawal. However, each leader generally understood an international agreement was required to bargain between the major power brokers involved to end the conflict.¹⁰⁶ It is also important to note a diplomatic agreement did not mean hostilities were over in any of the three cases; rather, the agreement was used by the external nation to withdraw combat troops, under the guise of an expectation that the insurgent was going to stop fighting as well. Nonetheless, the overarching political framework provided a filter-down effect of instituting

¹⁰⁶ However, it is important to note the Mujahideen were not invited to participate in the 1988 Geneva Accords, which scholars note as a reason for civil war onset in Afghanistan in the 1990s.

a withdrawal timetable for combat troops. Even with an international agreement, transitions at various levels of the military and government still impacted one another.

The case studies also highlight the importance of advising at the local security forces headquarters levels, preferably at locations where the host nation conducts operations. The British used this approach to great effect during the Malayan Emergency. Both the United States and the Soviet Union exhibited this approach as well. This afforded closer collaboration while the external nation's advisers were present in the host nation, maintained an advisor presence at the higher levels where the tactical, operational, and strategic levels interact, and minimized disruption at transition points when the external nation reduced its presence. This has the added benefit that the local security force is then already established in permanent headquarters locations when the external nation leaves.

The security dilemma warrants consideration due to the competition for control of the country in all case studies, even though this was seen in varying degrees. At times the security dilemma involves more group competition based on local warlords, as was the case of the Soviets in Afghanistan. At other times, the security dilemma involved competition over the country itself, as seen in the Vietnam and Malaya cases. The ability of the external nation to control the arming of the population became decisive, especially as the British successfully prevented the communists from accessing communist arms depots and supplies. On the other hand, as both the North Vietnamese and Mujahideen were able to build their combat power regardless of United States and Soviet involvement, the training of local security forces became ever more demanding against a well-armed enemy. As a result, the prospects of transitioning to a local security force are unfavorable when the local security forces are fighting a comparably sized and equipped force, which leads to the importance of long-term commitment until a conditions-based transition is available when the local security force is the dominant force in the country. However, the political environment will shape the decision-making in the external country and be the arbitrary actor in determining this outcome.

The interrelatedness of transitions also applies to the responsiveness of security forces in support of the central government. The success of the Malay security forces can be linked to their commitment to, and ties with, the central government. However, the security forces in South Vietnam and Afghanistan did not afford the same form of support to defend their central governments. Weak ties and a lack of trust resulted in security forces that did not meet the locals' needs and expectations. Rather, the security forces were viewed as another ineffective arm of government.

The third hypothesis presents the idea that a custom approach is necessary for each security forces development mission, as what is effective in one country may not work in another due to different political factors and agendas. Although the British have been credited with successfully carrying out a counterinsurgency campaign in the Malayan Emergency, lessons learned from this campaign should not be applied in blueprint fashion with an absolute expectation of success in other counterinsurgencies. The British have been unsuccessful in other counterinsurgency engagements, leading support for the third hypothesis presented that a custom approach is necessary for each instance of security forces development.¹⁰⁷ In addition, the successful resettlement programme in Malaya did not produce results equal to the Strategic Hamlets development program in Vietnam.¹⁰⁸ Rather, all counterinsurgencies should be treated as unique.¹⁰⁹ The concept of population control needs to be tailored to the conditions at hand.¹¹⁰ The Soviets also faced problems in modernizing Afghanistan according to their initial plans.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁷ Dixon, 11. British counterinsurgency operations in Palestine, Aden, Cyprus, and Kenya are noted as predominantly unsuccessful.

¹⁰⁸ Mackay, 149.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., 153.

¹¹⁰ Hack, 239-240.

¹¹¹ Braithwaite, 167-168.

Inflated or inaccurate metrics added to the difficulties in finding solutions compatible with host nation security realities, and metrics need to be customized to the specific conflict if they are to be useful. Instead of skewed metrics that present false progress, metrics should be based on an honest analysis. The results should be accepted whether they are good or bad. Once an honest assessment takes place, plans can adjust or continue on, as needed. The adjustment of strategy and planning occurred in the Malayan Emergency when progress was not sufficient. For example, retired General Briggs was brought on as a senior civilian to plan and carry out the change in strategy. Under a civilian appointment, Briggs also played into the political dynamics of the Emergency by keeping insurance rates low as a civil commotion, rather than a civil war.¹¹² Inflating positive indicators and minimizing negative trends is an issue if commanders are under extreme pressure for progress, which is especially tempting during short deployments of less than a year for military advisors. Data can be manipulated to give a false sense of progress, particularly if data collection does not support achievable operational and strategic goals. In short, development metrics of security forces are regularly adjusted to meet the political aims.

The fourth hypothesis states that nations with a heterogeneous population face more difficulty and take more time to transition to a local security force than nations with a homogenous population. Empirical support for this hypothesis was not substantiated in the research of these three case studies. The British faced a heterogeneous population in Malaya but were able to overcome ethnic differences and effectively transfer responsibility to local security forces and assist the Malays in creating a new government. The population in South Vietnam was fairly homogenous, although this variable did not factor into American advising efforts nor did it assist in rapidly developing the RVNAF. The Soviets faced a crafty opponent that provided an alternative to the Soviet-backed government, although the Mujahideen were unable to unite the Afghanistan population as well, largely due to other power disparities based upon regional

¹¹² Barber, 113-118.

politics. Alternatively, perhaps one effective way to overcome disparities in securing a heterogeneous population (and a homogenous population, for the matter) is the establishment of the police arm of security forces that represents and protects all groups in the population.

Recommendations

At present, the United States is committed to ending the Afghanistan war dependent upon the establishment of and transition to capable local security forces working under the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIROA) that provides security and maintains the sovereignty of Afghanistan. A contrasting option is that the United States could abandon the campaign and leave the development of security forces for GIROA to figure out on its own. In order to prevent this abrupt withdrawal from occurring, transition points are publicized as the most effective way for the United States to transfer responsibility over to the ANSF. This monograph argues for an alternate view. Since it is unlikely the United States or any other country will increase troop levels for additional training efforts of the ANSF, the focus should be on creating self-sufficient security forces by maintaining a long-term US presence that is politically feasible. Building on the achievements that have been made over the course of the war and adjusting to the unique needs of GIROA should promote a long-term relationship that remains mutually beneficial for both nations.

ANSF security forces development is tied to infrastructure development in Afghanistan. However, the military transition to the ANSF may be misplaced as too narrow a focus, due in part to geo-politics and long-term United States and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) strategy. Instead, the focus should be on maintaining an Afghan government and security force that is cooperative and at least partially reliant on United States and NATO support as Afghanistan is rebuilt. Keeping a permanent presence of US military and diplomatic personnel in Afghanistan has the best chance of retaining the gains made in Afghanistan and serves as a foundation to further build future relationships between both countries and even Afghanistan's

neighbors. Such a relationship between Afghanistan and the United States is a long-term investment for reasons of national security, globalization, and unforeseeable opportunities, similar to the permanent presence the United States has elsewhere in Southeast and East Asia. The United States has a limited presence in the Central Asia geographic region aside from its bases in Afghanistan, yet the United States has substantial interests and will remain closely engaged with the complex and often tense diplomatic relationships with Afghanistan and nearby countries, especially Iran, Pakistan, China and Russia. Afghanistan has not and will not change quickly, so a premature transition is likely to result in failure and greater civil war, just as happened when the Soviets left in 1989. A wartime transition decision should be rejected in favor of a long-term relationship and partnership between the United States and Afghanistan put in its place.

Further study of transitions from other conflicts is beneficial in the search for ideas that can be formatted for application to the Afghanistan campaign. Most importantly, military leaders must report results in security forces development, as they understand them, especially if the operation is not producing the desired results. Political leaders must do the same. Trainers and advisors must continue an open dialogue on the challenges they face and determine what steps can be taken to mitigate the issues, even when this includes recommendations for an adjustment to the transition strategy. For instance, if the security dilemma becomes an intrastate problem that leads to an escalation of violence and the armament of local groups, solutions must be sought to hold together Afghanistan society and continue to develop the ANSF and avoid the temptation of transitioning prematurely.

An option to evaluate when units in the ANSF are deemed ready for transition is to establish a theater-wide group responsible for military transition decisions. Afghanistan/Pakistan Hands (APH) personnel, with their Afghan-specific expertise and as specialists in varied military disciplines, are logical choices to outfit transition groups tailored to review any type of ANSF unit. Operating as an independent trusted agent, transition groups can provide the transition

recommendation for all ANSF units, to limit any bias that may be found from a transition recommendation from actual US military advisors operating directly with an ANSF unit. Consequently, this transition group concept will provide a holistic review of the ANSF, built upon an individual ANSF unit review, and also provide valuable assessments for APH leadership. Further, if there is operational concern on a certain ANSF unit, the transition group can perform a review on the unit in question and gauge the necessity to re-institute advisor support.

The APH program provides a pre-established and long-term approach that has been custom-designed and tailored to the unique needs of the US campaign in Afghanistan. Tying the diverse specialties of the APH program further in with the diplomatic skill set of Foreign Affairs Officers and Department of State personnel is one way to leverage the US Government's military and civilian organic experience. For many years, APH personnel have spent considerable time establishing important relationships throughout all levels of the GIROA government, ministries, and the ANSF. This valuable capability cannot be easily replicated and can be used to maintain a US military presence in the region for years to come.

All three case studies presented in this monograph exhibit how advisory missions require more time than the war itself. Advisory missions are present both before and after open hostilities. Perhaps one solution for Afghanistan lies in a Korean War-type outcome, from the standpoint of an open-ended commitment that establishes a permanent presence of US military forces, advisors, and diplomats. This is especially important for a country such as Afghanistan, formed from prolonged periods of armed conflict dating back centuries, even before it was first organized under a central government in 1747.¹¹³ A seventeen-year military intervention is merely the current war in what is unfortunately an all too common reality in this war-torn country. If the United States completely withdraws now, other groups are eagerly waiting to fill

¹¹³ Grau and Gress, 6.

the power vacuum that will be created. Therefore, it is necessary to implement a flexible transition process.

The United States should continue its primary efforts on building self-sufficient ANSF that are representative of the Afghanistan population. As the United States remains in close partnership with GIRoA, responsibilities should be transitioned on a piecemeal basis. However, it will be important to resume advising efforts if transition points do not produce successful results, to diffuse a security dilemma, or address government repression. In this sense, stability and advising missions are a part of war. It is important to keep in mind that “war is a protean activity, constantly changing. It is never safe to assume that we have finally discovered its true and permanent nature.”¹¹⁴ Similarly, the training of local security forces constantly changes too. Advisors must adapt to create a local security force that is tailored to the needs of its own nation and responsive to its entire population, especially in the rural areas of Afghanistan. If an external nation believes its political interests are at stake, the persistent training of local security forces is necessary with an anticipated transition at some point. However, the training of local security forces should remain flexible and adaptive to the situation and extent the external nation can afford, recognizing a long-term commitment with results that are varied and difficult to forecast. While operating in these conditions, the military must always be cognizant of the political ramifications under which they are developing security forces. This process can identify and address the presence of a security dilemma at local, regional, or national levels.

The security dilemma is a useful tool to understand the challenges in handing over responsibility to a local security force and dangers that accompany providing too much power to a certain group or groups. Rather, for a local security force to be successful, it must promote and put forth the best interests of the state as a whole, and must be careful not to support the interests of other groups that compete with the state. Otherwise, the local security force cannot grasp and

¹¹⁴ David Fisher, *Morality and War: Can War be Just in the Twenty-first Century?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 165.

handle the state's security needs. Rather, further violence results that may spiral into never-ending competition between groups over control of the government. Advisors should understand that as they generate the ANSF, the ANSF must have the inherent ability to either limit or put a security dilemma to rest, such that the ANSF are recognized as the predominant security arm of GIRoA and that both the government and security forces are recognized as legitimate. What legitimacy means to Afghanistan will be unique to this country and its internal political dynamics, requiring balance and cooperation between regional and central governments and power brokers. The United States should recognize the presence of a security dilemma and determine how to overcome its effects in the development of the ANSF.

Looking forward, the United States should continue advising throughout GIRoA and in the ANSF to impart as much responsibility and ownership on Afghan leadership in improving the country as a whole. Although setbacks will continue to occur, transitions provide an incremental approach to build Afghanistan. Overall, stability and security in Afghanistan is achievable over time as Afghans take on more responsibility in building their nation with continued assistance from the United States and other partner nations.

Conclusion

This monograph looked at the implications of transitions to local security forces driven by politics. As transitions were mired in political decision-making at a broad scale, the actual transitions were driven themselves across all levels from international agreements and peace treaties. Even once a peace treaty was in place, hostilities did not cease. As the United States continues its campaign in Afghanistan, a peace treaty is more or less a necessary framework to complete a wartime transition. The US military is still able to operate with ANSF, most certainly under a specified legal status, in part to continue building a stable and independent GIRoA. Previous conflicts provided examples of successful and unsuccessful approaches to security forces development.

The cases of the British Malayan Emergency, US war in Vietnam, and the Soviet war in Afghanistan examined the four hypotheses. The first hypothesis was supported that a nation with weak infrastructure requires longer periods of time to transition. Often the development of security forces is only one small piece of a much larger nation-building program. This also lead support for the second hypothesis, that transitions were inter-related at various levels of the host nation government. The third hypothesis was supported for a custom approach required to develop security forces. The implications of this hypothesis even spanned over time in a nation itself, where development efforts are constantly evolving as both host nation and external countries change. Lastly, there was not much evidence supporting the fourth hypothesis. The homogenous or heterogeneous populations did not appear significant in relation to transitions to local security forces.

The indications of a security dilemma are present in Afghanistan as various groups compete for power as the country is developing and the infrastructure is improving. Advisors should continue to accurately and honestly assess the capabilities of the ANSF in all development efforts and transition accordingly. Further, the APH program provides advisors to sustain ANSF and GIRoA development over the long-term in a customized fashion.

At least 30-years is anticipated before Afghanistan may be ready for transition. Local security forces should continue to be developed to the point when they can defeat the internal insurgency and prevent a security dilemma in Afghanistan. Nation building will be needed after war has ended, requiring considerable external assistance. The governmental institutions for administration, judicial, education, health, and all others should be developed as security is established. The host nation leaders that are being trained during the intervention are the generations that, once in power over the coming decades, should acquire the know-how to rebuild the country to bring lasting change with the hopeful end to civil war in Afghanistan.

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